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BACKWARD INDUCTION FOUNDATIONS OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE
Ben McQuillin1
and Robert Sugden2
We present a noncooperative game model of coalitional bargaining, closely
based on that of Gul (1989) but solvable by backward induction. In this game,
Gul's condition of `value additivity' does not suce to ensure the existence of a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that supports the Shapley value, but a related
condition - `no positive value-externalities' - does. Multiple equilibria can arise
only in the event of ties, and with a mild restriction on tie-break rules these
equilibria all support the Shapley value.
Keywords: Shapley value, Nash program, noncooperative coalitional bar-
gaining.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper builds on the important contribution by Gul (1989, 1999)
within a literature of the last three decades that provides `bargaining foun-
dations' to solution concepts in cooperative game theory. This literature, in
the spirit of the `Nash program', treats the noncooperative and cooperative
approaches as mutually illuminative. Gul sets up an intuitively plausible
noncooperative bargaining process in which coalitions form through succes-
sive pairwise amalgamations (presented as buyouts), and shows that this
process is in certain senses supportive of the well known value of Shapley
(1953). The process is innite: coalitional bargaining is allowed to continue
for as long as the grand coalition has not formed, and takes place alongside
the underlying cooperative event. These aspects of the set-up have certain
1b.mcquillin@uea.ac.uk, School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Exper-
imental Social Science, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK.
2r.sugden@uea.ac.uk, School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experi-
mental Social Science, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK.
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advantages in terms of mathematical tractability, but also certain disadvan-
tages: in particular, where there are subgame perfect Nash equilibria that
support the Shapley value there may also be others that do not. In this
paper we modify Gul's bargaining process so that it is nite and so that
it precedes the underlying cooperative event. The noncooperative game is
then solvable by backward induction and we can therefore draw sharper con-
clusions about the relationship between its subgame perfect Nash equilibria
and the Shapley value of the underlying cooperative game.
In Gul's bargaining game, `value-additivity' ensures that some subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) implements the Shapley value, but not
that every SPNE does so. In our modied bargaining game it requires a
stronger condition - `no positive value-externalities' - to ensure the existence
of a SPNE that implements the Shapley value, but the same condition then
ensures that every SPNE implements the value.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We consider any transferable utility game in characteristic function form
(N; v), with N denoting a set of n players, v : 2N ! R having properties (i)
v(?) = 0, and (ii) for any partition  of N , PI2 v(I)  v(N).
The Shapley value assigns to (N; v) an n-tuple, , of players expectations
in (N; v), dened by (for any i 2 N):
i 
X
IN
(jIj   1)!(n  jIj)!
n!
(v(I)  v (I n fig)) .
Gul (1989) denes a related solution concept: the generalized Shapley
value. Let  denote the set of partitions of N , and M the set of embed-
ded coalitions, M  f(I; ) :  2 ; I 2 g. The generalized Shapley value
assigns to (N; v) a mapping,  : M ! R, dened by (for any (I; ) 2M):
(I; )  X
T
(jT j   1)!(jj   jT j)!
jj!
 
v
 S
J2T
J
!
  v
 S
J2(TnfIg)
J
!!
.
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For present purposes, it suces just to view the generalized Shapley
value as a formal object; but the intuition is that it assigns expectations
to prior coalitions, and it does so by treating the prior coalitions as players
in a subgame, and by applying the Shapley value to that subgame. Clearly
(for any i 2 N), (fig; ffjg : j 2 N)g) = i.
We shall dene two noncooperative games, based on our underlying co-
operative game (N; v), each also with player sets N . The innite time bar-
gaining game is the one set up by Gul, and the deadline bargaining game is
our modication of Gul's game. In both these games, coalitional bargaining
takes place over a sequence of periods. At the start of each period, play-
ers are arranged as a partition, or coalition structure, each element being a
coalition. At the start of the rst period, the coalition structure is the set
of singletons ffig : i 2 Ng. At any stage, one player in each coalition is its
representative. A player is active if and only if she represents some coalition.
In each period (unless the grand coalition has already formed) there is some
opportunity for two coalitions to merge by mutual agreement. Mergers take
the form of buy-outs : the representative of one of the coalitions makes a
payment to the representative of the other, and becomes the sole represen-
tative of the merged coalition. Payos to embedded coalitions, as specied
by v, accrue to the representatives of the corresponding coalitions in the
bargaining game. The full denition of each game requires an additional
parameter. In the innite time game, a parameter  2 (0; 1) sets a common
discount factor; in the deadline game a natural number parameter  sets
the length of the game.
In the innite time game (with discount factor ) the sequence of time
periods is innite: (1; 2; : : :). Players' outcome utilities are given by in-period
payments, adjusted by , so for any player a payment amount of 1 in time
period t is worth t units of utility. In each time period, if there are two or
more active players the following in-period bargaining process occurs ((a)-
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(d)). (a) From among the active players, nature selects a pair, with the
probability of being selected being equal across active players. (b) Nature
then selects one member of this pair to be the proposer, with either member
being chosen with equal probability and the other member becoming the
responder. (c) Then the proposer selects an oer : any real number. (d) Then
the responder decides whether to accept or reject the oer. If she accepts
then she receives a payment equal to the oer and ceases to be active. In this
case the proposer, correspondingly, makes a payment equal to the oer and
becomes the sole representative both of the players she already represented
and of the players previously represented by the responder. At the end
of each time period, each player that remains active receives a payment
amount given by (1   )v(A) where A  N is the set of players that she
now represents.1 Then the next time period begins.
In the deadline game (of length ) the sequence of time periods is nite:
(1; 2; :::; ). Players' outcome utilities are given directly by total payments,
so for any player a payment amount of 1 in any time period is worth one unit
of utility. In each period, if there are two or more active players the same
in-period bargaining process ((a)-(d) as described above) occurs. In contrast
to the innite time game, there are no additional payments to active players
at the end of each time period, except period . At the end of period , each
player that remains active receives a payment given by v(A) where A  N
is the set of players she represents.
Gul's results, and ours, relate to SPNEs in the bargaining games set out
above. To simplify analysis, we assume that ties (situations in which the
maximum oer a proposer is willing to make exactly equals the minimum
oer a responder is willing to accept) within a SPNE lead to an accepted
1The utility outcome for a player that represents A throughout the bargaining game
is therefore
P1
t=0 
t(1  )v(A) = v(A).
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oer with some xed exogenous probability, or tie-break rule.2
Gul uses two further equilibrium conditions: `stationarity', and that `every
possible meeting ends in agreement'. `Stationarity' entails that players'
strategies specify (for the same coalition structure) the same behavior in
every time period. `Every possible meeting ends in agreement' entails that
players' strategies specify, in every situation, oers by proposers that are
deemed acceptable by the corresponding responders, so the grand coalition
will form directly, in n  1 time periods.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE INFINITE TIME BARGAINING GAME
Gul's (1989, 1999) analysis is of the innite time bargaining game, and
his results are obtained in a limit as  tends to 1.
Gul's rst result states that, in any stationary SPNE such that every
possible meeting ends in agreement, the expected utility to any player i
at the start of the innite time bargaining game is arbitrarily close (if 
is suciently close to 1) to i. His second result concerns conditions on v
for the existence of such an equilibrium. A necessary condition is value-
additivity of v, v being value-additive if and only if:
8 2 ;8I; J 2 ;(I [J; ( n fI; Jg)[fI [ Jg)  (I; ) + (J; ):
A sucient condition combines value-additivity with strict superadditivity,
v being strictly superadditive if and only if for all non-empty and disjoint
subsets I and J of N , v(I [ J) > v(I) + v(J).
2It is a straightforward matter to also admit to our analysis more elaborate tie-break
rules in which the probability of agreement in a tie depends on the time period, the
coalition structure, the players represented by the proposer and the players represented
by the responder. However, because of the backward induction analysis we use, we cannot
admit tie-break rules that depend otherwise on the history of the game or on the specic
identities of coalitions' representatives. Gul (1989, 1999) incorporates a similar limitation
into his full `stationarity' condition.
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So (in the limit, as  tends to 1) the innite time game supports the
Shapley value, but only provided that v is both superadditive and value-
additive, and then only in one SPNE among possible others (which are
non-stationary, or in which possible meetings do not end in agreement).3
4. ANALYSIS OF THE DEADLINE BARGAINING GAME
Our analysis is of the deadline bargaining game, and our results are ob-
tained in a limit as  tends to 1:
The deadline bargaining game preserves Gul's plausible, intuitive proce-
dure of pairwise agreement but, for a given tie-break rule, it has a unique
SPNE which can be found by backward induction. Our main result employs
a new condition on v, stronger than value-additivity: no positive value-
externalities, dened as follows. There are no positive value externalities in
v if and only if:
8 2 ;8I; J;K 2 ;(K; )  (K; ( n fI; Jg) [ fI [ Jg)  0:
Theorem 1 If there are no positive value-externalities in v then, for any
" > 0, there is an integer t such that, for any  > t, in every SPNE of the
deadline bargaining game (of length ), the expected utility of every player
i lies within " of i.
(The proof of Theorem 1 is in the Appendix.)
So, if there are no positive value-externalities in v then (in the limit as
 tends to 1) the deadline bargaining game supports the Shapley value in
every SPNE. Relative to the innite time game, the deadline bargaining
3Gul (1999) shows that if v is convex then, among all stationary strategy proles, those
in which every possible meeting ends in agreement will have the distinction of being those
which are `ecient' in the sense of maximising total expected utility across players. But
Hart and Levy (1999) demonstrate by example that eciency does not entail immediate
agreement more generally.
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game supports the Shapley value less equivocally, but on a smaller class of
cooperative games. The condition of no positive value-externalities states
that within the generalized Shapley value every externality associated with
any bilateral amalgamation is non-positive, whereas Gul's value-additivity
condition can be read as saying that (since the generalized Shapley value
summed across any partition is, by construction, equal to the payo of the
grand coalition) the sum of value-externalities associated with any bilateral
amalgamation is non-positive.4
Having observed that a stronger condition than value-additivity ensures,
in the relevant limit, that every SPNE in the deadline game supports the
Shapley value, we should note the following.
Remark 1 Value-additivity, even combined with strict superadditivity, is
not sucient (unless there are fewer than 5 players) to ensure that there
exists at least one SPNE of the deadline game that supports the Shapley
value.
(The proof of Remark 1 is in the Appendix.)
5. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
The proof of Theorem 1 leads also to two further results. First, recall
that in the innite time game the condition of value-additivity (plus strict
superadditivity) ensures the existence of a stationary SPNE that supports
the Shapley value, but fails to ensure the non-existence of a stationary SPNE
that does not. We nd that the condition of no positive value-externalities
4Gul's value-additivity condition can be re-written, using the denition of :
8 2 (N);8I; J 2 ;
X
K2nfI;Jg
(K;)  (K; ( n fI; Jg) [ fI [ Jg)  0:
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ensures this absence.
Remark 2 If v has no positive value-externalities then, in the relevant
limit, the innite time game supports the Shapley value in every stationary
SPNE.
Second, we have so far presented an analysis based on an underlying
cooperative game in characteristic function form. However, the structure of
our proofs is such that we could as easily have presented the same analysis
based on an underlying game (N;w) in partition function form, w : M ! R.
(In a deadline bargaining game based on (N;w), at the end of period , the
game would end with each player that remains active receiving a payment
given by w(A; ) where A  N is the set of players she represents and 
is the prevailing coalition structure.) For a partition function w : M ! R,
we dene its characteristic function reduction T (w) : 2N ! R, using 8I 
N; T (w)(I)  w(I; fI;N n Ig). The extended Shapley value, characterized
in McQuillin (2009), assigns to (N;w) an n-tuple of expectations which is
just the Shapley value of (N; T (w)). And the following result holds.
Remark 3 If there are no positive value-externalities in the characteristic
function reduction of w then (in the relevant limits) the extended Shapley
value is supported both by the deadline game (in every SPNE) and by the
innite time game (in every stationary SPNE).
(The proofs of Remarks 2 and 3 are in the Appendix.)
6. DISCUSSION
Our paper is a contribution to a well-established project of game theory.
The aim of this project is to build stylized models of real-world bargaining
procedures and to investigate the conditions under which solution concepts
from cooperative game theory are induced by fully rational bargaining. Our
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model is based on that of Gul (1989), and retains its key feature, which is
that cooperative structures arise through sequences of bilateral agreements.
In contrast, in alternative implementations of the Shapley value such as
proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) and Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001) the coalition structure changes only once, and there is never more
than one non-singleton coalition. Which of these modelling strategies is
more useful depends on the bargaining procedure that is to be represented.
However, many institutional frameworks for real-world bargaining, most no-
tably the merger and takeover process by which rms amalgamate5, involve
sequences of coalition formation similar to those of our model. It is therefore
striking to nd that the Shapley value - a concept that is often interpreted
as based on normative axioms - can emerge as the outcome in a noncooper-
ative model of bargaining that is applicable to such institutions.6 Whether
the Shapley value does so emerge depends on properties of the underlying
cooperative game.
Gul (1989, p. 90) suggests that value-additivity is \key in determining
whether a given characteristic function game constitutes a suitable frame-
work for the application of the Shapley value". Our results in this paper
suggest rather that a closely related, but stronger condition is key in this
sense. Value-additivity (combined with strict superadditivity) ensures that
Gul's innite time bargaining game has a stationary SPNE that supports
the Shapley value but there may be other stationary SPNEs that do not.
In our deadline bargaining game, value-additivity and strict superadditivity
do not guarantee the existence of a SPNE that supports the Shapley value.
However, the condition of no positive value-externalities ensures that every
stationary SPNE in Gul's game and every SPNE in our game supports the
5This point is developed in Macho-Stadler et al (2006).
6The Shapley value emerges as the expectatation within the bargaining game, which
is consistent with the way that Shapley (1953) conceived the value.
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Shapley value.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
Our proofs are constructed using the set   of games in partition function
form on the player set N , generically w : M ! R such that, for any  2 ,
w(?; ) = 0 andPI2 w(I; )  w(N; fNg). Notice that in any SPNE of the
deadline bargaining game, with any given number of time periods remaining,
for each embedded coalition (I; ), there is a well-dened expectation: i.e.
the expected value of future in-period payments to the player who represents
I. The function that assigns these expectations to embedded coalitions is
an element of  . Also,  is an element of  .
In the deadline game, each SPNE corresponds to a tie-break rule: the
exogenously given probability with which, when the maximum oer a pro-
poser is willing to make exactly equals the minimum oer a responder is
willing to accept, this oer is accepted. We denote this probability  2 [0; 1].
For a given SPNE, the relationship between expectations in adjacent time
periods can be described using formal constructions that we shall term back-
ward induction sequences. The items within these sequences are elements of
 .
In this appendix we shall rst dene a backward induction sequence and
then set down a lemma in respect of this construction. Theorem 1 and also
Remarks 2 and 3 follow almost immediately from the lemma. Remark 1 is
proved by an example.
Given w 2  , we dened a characteristic function T (w) : 2N ! R us-
ing 8I  N; T (w)(I)  w(I; fI;N n Ig). From the characteristic function
v : 2N ! R, we dene S(v) 2   using: 8(I; ) 2M;S(v)(I; )  v(I).
We shall from this point use (v), where we have previously used , to
denote the generalized Shapley value of (N; v). This more general notation
allows us to reference the generalized Shapley value of other transferable
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utility characteristic function games (on N), for example the generalized
Shapley value of (N; v) becomes (v).
A.1. Backward induction sequences
We need to set up some additional notation: terms that describe the in-
ternal and external eects, within some w 2  , of coalitions amalgamating.
Given  2 , we shall use IJ as a shorthand for ( n fI; Jg) [ fI [ Jg. For
any (A; ) 2M , for any pair of coalitions fI; Jg  , and for any  2 [0; 1],
we dene two formal objects, F fI;Jgw (A; ) and G
fI;Jg
w; (A; ). The rst term
can be read as `the eect on A if I and J amalgamate'; the second term
can be read as `the eect on A if I and J amalgamate if the interior eects
are positive, do not do so if the interior eects are negative, and do so with
probability  if the interior eects are null'. In either case the supposition
is that A may or may not be a member of fI; Jg, and that amalgamating
coalitions share the surplus equally. So:
F fI;Jgw (A; ) 
8>><>>:
w

I[J;IJ

 w(I;) w(J;)
2
where A 2 fI; Jg
w

A;
IJ


 w(A; ) where A =2 fI; Jg
.
GfI;Jgw; (A; ) 
8>>>><>>>>:
F fI;Jgw (A; ) where w

I [ J; IJ

> w(I; ) + w(J; )
F fI;Jgw (A; ) where w

I [ J; IJ

= w(I; ) + w(J; )
0 where w

I [ J; IJ

< w(I; ) + w(J; )
.
We now consider the deadline bargaining game (of length ) dened on
v. Suppose, in the SPNE associated with the tie-break rule , with t < 
periods remaining in this game, expected future payments to the remaining
active players are described by wt 2  . That is, the player that represents
coalition I within the coalition structure  expects a sum of payments over
periods (( t); ( t+1); :::; ) equal to wt(I; ). By backward induction, in
the same equilibrium of the bargaining game, with t+ 1 periods remaining,
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expected future payments to the remaining active players are described by
wt+1 2  , satisfying:
8(A; ) 2M;wt+1(A; ) = wt(A; ) +
2
P
fI;Jg GfI;Jgwt; (A; )
jj (jj   1) : (1)
We dene a backward induction sequence to be a sequence fwtg1t=0 in  
with the property that there exists  2 [0; 1] such that, for any non-negative
integer t, equation (1) is satised.
A.2. Lemma 1
We can now state our Lemma.
Lemma 1 For any w 2  , if T (w) has no positive value-externalities,
then for any " > 0, there exists t0 2 N such that, for any t > t0, for any
(I; ) 2 M , in any backward induction sequence fwtg1t=0 with w0 = w,
jwt(I; )  (T (w))(I; )j < ".
A.3. Proof of Lemma 1
For any w 2   we dene ew  w (T (w)). (T (w)) has, by construction,
the following `eciency' property:
8 2 ;X
I2
(T (w))(I; ) = w(N; fNg): (2)
And it also has, using results in McQuillin (2009) (Theorems 3 and 2 re-
spectively), the following two properties:
8(A; ) 2M; X
fI;Jg
F
fI;Jg
(T (w))(A; ) = 0: (3)
(T ((T (w)))) = (T (w)): (4)
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Any backward induction sequence fwtg1t=0 has the following properties:
8t 2 Z>0;8 2 ;
X
I2
fwt(I; ) 6 0: (5)
8t 2 Z>1;8(A; ) 2M; jj 6 2! wt(A; )  (T (w0)) = 0: (6)
And (using (4) and (6)):
8t 2 Z>0;(T (wt)) = (T (w0))
) fwt = wt   (T (w0)): (7)
We now consider some partition function game w : M ! R such that
T (w) has no positive value-externalities, and we consider the set of all
backward induction sequences fwtg1t=0 with w0 = w. We write this set as
ffw;tg1t=0 :  2 [0; 1]; w;0 = wg, with:
8t 2 Z>0;8(A; ) 2M;8 2 [0; 1];
w;t+1(A; ) = w;t(A; ) +
2
P
fI;Jg GfI;Jgwt; (A; )
jj (jj   1)
) w^;t+1(A; ) = gw;t(A; ) + 2
P
fI;Jg GfI;Jgwt; (A; )
jj (jj   1): (8)
Using (2) and (3):
8(A; ) 2M; 8 2 [0; 1]; X
fI;Jg
G
fI;Jg
(T (w));(A; ) = 0: (9)
We proceed by induction. (We simplify the induction hypothesis by disre-
garding epsilons.) Suppose, for some positive integers k > 2 and t0:
8t 2 Z>t0 ;8 2 [0; 1];8(A; ) 2M; jj 6 k ! gw;t(A; ) = 0: (10)
((6) and (7) establish this hypothesis for k = 2.) Our aim is to show that
then:
8" > 0;9t00 2 Z>t0 ;8 2 ;8t 2 Z>t00 ;8 2 [0; 1];8(A; ) 2M;
jj 6 k + 1! jgw;t(A; )j < ": (11)
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Consider any  2 , such that jj = k + 1, and any integer t > t0. Then
consider any  2 [0; 1] and any A 2  such that gwp;t(A; ) 6 0. Using the
induction hypothesis (10):
8I 2  n fAg; GfI;Agw;t (A; ) > GfI;Ag(T (w))(A; ) 
(gw;t(A; ) + gw;t(I; ))
2
)
X
I2nfAg
GfI;Agw;t (A; ) >
0@ X
I2nfAg
G
fI;Ag
(T (w))(A; )
1A 
0@ X
I2nfAg
gw;t(I; )
2
1A
 (jj   1)gw;t(A; )
2
)
X
I2nfAg
GfI;Agw;t (A; ) >
0@ X
I2nfAg
G
fI;Ag
(T (w))(A; )
1A   X
I2
gw;t(I; )
2
!
 (jj   2)gw;t(A; )
2
: (12)
Combining (5) and (12) gives:
X
I2nfAg
GfI;Agw;t (A; ) >
0@ X
I2nfAg
G
fI;Ag
(T (w))(A; )
1A  (jj   2)gw;t(A; )
2
: (13)
Note also (again using the induction hypothesis, and as there are no positive
value-externalities in T (w)):
8fI; Jg 2  n fAg; GfI;Jgw;t (A; ) > GfI;Jg(T (w))(A; ): (14)
Combining (13) and (14) gives:
X
fI;Jg
GfI;Jgw;t (A; ) >
0@ X
fI;Jg
G
fI;Jg
(T (w))(A; )
1A  (jj   2)gw;t(A; )
2
: (15)
Combining (9) and (15) gives:
X
fI;Jg
GfI;Jgw;t (A; ) >
 (jj   2)gw;t(A; )
2
: (16)
Combining (8) and (16) gives:
w^;t+1(A; ) >
( (jj   2)gw;t(A; ))
jj (jj   1) + gw;t(A; )
) w^;t+1(A; ) >
 
1  (jj   2)jj (jj   1)
! gw;t(A; ): (17)
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Now consider any B 2  such that gw;t(B; ) > 0: Note (recollecting the
steps that led to (13)):
X
I2nfBg
GfI;Bgw;t (A; ) >
0@ X
I2nfBg
G
fI;Bg
(T (w))(B; )
1A  (jj   2)gw;t(B; )
2
: (18)
Note also:
8fI; Jg 2  n fBg; GfI;Jgw;t (B; ) > GfI;Jg(T (w))(B; )  gw;t(B; ): (19)
Combining (9), (18) and (19) gives:
X
fI;Jg
GfI;Jgw;t (A; ) >  
jj (jj   2)gw;t(B; )
2
: (20)
Combining (8) and (20), and collecting terms gives:
w^;t+1(B; ) >
gw;t(B; )
(jj   1)
) w^;t+1(B; ) > 0: (21)
It is clear from (5), (17) and (21) that:
0 > min
2[0;1];A2
w^;t+1(A; ) >
 
1  (jj   2)jj (jj   1)
!
min
2[0;1];A2
gw;t(A; ): (22)
And it is clear from (5) and (22) that
n
max2[0;1];A2 jgw;t(A; )jo1
t=0
con-
verges to zero. This gives us our proof of (11) and therefore of Lemma 1.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 1
In any SPNE of the deadline bargaining game (of length ), the expected
utility to player i is given by the term w(fig; ffjg : j 2 N)g) in a backward
induction sequence fwtg1t=0 with w0 = S(v). So, by Lemma 1 we directly
have Theorem 1.
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A.5. Proof of Remark 1
Remark 1 is established by the following example. We suppose N =
f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g. (It is easy to show that in games with fewer than four players,
value-additivity implies no positive value-externalities. One can also show
that in games with four players value-additivity suces to ensure that the
deadline game supports the Shapley value, but in this case the proof is
cumbersome and unenlightening.) We then dene v  (va + vb + vc + vd)
12 + ve
10000
where:
va(A) =
8><>: 1 where f1; 2; 4g  A0 otherwise
vb(A) =
8><>: 1 where jf1; 2; 4; 5g \ Aj > 30 otherwise
vc(A) =
8><>: 1 where f1; 3; 5g  A0 otherwise
vd(A) =
8><>: 1 where jf1; 3; 4; 5g \ Aj > 30 otherwise
ve(A) = jAj   1:
We show (v) with v (va + vb + vc + vd)12 in Figure 1. Then (ve) is
given by (ve)(A; ) =

jAj   1jj

, and we have (v) = (v) + 1
10000
(ve).
It should be noted that vis value-additive and weakly superadditive, and ve
value-additive and strictly superadditive; so v is value-additive and strictly
superadditive. In a backward induction sequence, (v) is a stationary point:
that is, for w  (v), for any  2 [0; 1], for any (A; ) 2M :
w(A; ) = w(A; ) +
2
P
fI;Jg G
fI;Jg
w; (A; )
jj (jj   1) :
However, the same stationarity property holds for w dened, with _ 
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ffjg : j 2 Ng, as follows:
w (f1g; _) = (v) (f1g; _)  44
99
+ 22
660
1
10000
w (f2g; _) = w (f3g; _) = (v) (f2g; ) + 2
99
  13
660
1
10000
w (f4g; _) = w (f5g; ) = (v) (f4g; ) + 20
99
+ 2
660
1
10000
w (A; ) = (v) (A; ) where  6= _:
[Figure 1 around here.]
Both of these stationary points correspond to expectations within sta-
tionary SPNEs in the innite time bargaining game. (The rst corresponds
to a stationary SPNE in which all meetings end in agreement; the second
to a stationary SPNE in which meetings end in agreement except, while the
singleton structure prevails, meetings between f2g and f3g, between f2g
and f4g or between f3g and f5g.) But it transpires that it is to the second
of these stationary points, which is not (v), that the (unique) backward in-
duction sequence fwtg1t=0 with w0  S(v) converges. The graphs in Figures
2 and 3 plot the associated sequence ffwtg1t=0, fwt  wt   (v), for coali-
tions embedded in the nest coalition structure (Figure 2), and in coalition
structures of cardinality four (Figure 3). (Figure 3 shows six of the ten coali-
tion structures of cardinality four, the remainder, entailing coalitions f1; 3g,
f1; 5g, f3; 4g and f3; 5g, follow by symmetries with those shown entailing
f1; 2g, f1; 4g, f2; 5g and f2; 4g respectively.) Figure 2 illustrates, for exam-
ple, that the sequence ffwt(f1g; ff1g ; f2g ; f3g ; f4g ; f5gg)g1t=0 converges to
 44
99
+ 22
660
1
10000

from above.
[Figure 2 around here.]
[Figure 3 around here.]
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A.6. Proof of Remark 2
Gul (1989) shows that, in the limit as  tends to 1, in every stationary
SPNE of the innite time bargaining game dened on v, at the start of any
time period, expected future payments to the remaining active players are
described by some w 2   that is a stationary point in a backward induction
sequence and that fulls the following:
8(I; ) 2M; jj 6 2! w(I; ) = (v)(I; ): (23)
If w fulls equation (23) then T (w) equals T ((v)), and (T (w))
equals (T ((v))). McQuillin (2009) shows that (T ((v))) equals (v), so
therefore (T (w)) equals (v); and if v has no positive value-externalities
then T (w) has no positive value-externalities. By Lemma 1, if w is a
stationary point in a backward induction sequence it must be that w equals
(T (w)) and therefore w equals (v) and so 8i 2 N;w(fig; ffjg : j 2
N)g) = i.
A.7. Proof of Remark 3
In any SPNE of the deadline bargaining game (of length ) dened on
(N;w), the expected utility to player i is given by the term w(fig; ffjg :
j 2 N)g) in a backward induction sequence fwtg1t=0 with w0 = w. So, by
Lemma 1 we directly have the result that (as  tends to 1) the extended
Shapley value is supported by the deadline game (in every SPNE). Analo-
gous reasoning to that used in the proof of Remark 2 gives the result that
(as  tends to 1) the extended Shapley value is supported by the innite
time game (in every stationary SPNE).
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Figure 1:  Φ(𝑣𝑣′) with 𝑣𝑣′ ≡ (𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎+𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏 + 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + 𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑) × 12.
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Figure 2:  �𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴,𝜋𝜋 ≡ 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴,𝜋𝜋 − Φ 𝑣𝑣 𝐴𝐴,𝜋𝜋
with 𝑤𝑤0 ≡ 𝒮𝒮(𝑣𝑣) and 𝜋𝜋 = 5. 
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Figure 3:  �𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴,𝜋𝜋 ≡ 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴,𝜋𝜋 − Φ 𝑣𝑣 𝐴𝐴,𝜋𝜋
with 𝑤𝑤0 ≡ 𝒮𝒮(𝑣𝑣) and 𝜋𝜋 = 4.
